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Abstract—State estimation is a fundamental process needed for
the effective operation of the smart grid. As such, cyber-physical
attacks such as denial-of-service and data injection attacks, which
often target the availability and the integrity of the collected state
estimation measurements, can have detrimental consequences on
the operation of the system. In this paper, a novel graph-theoretic
framework is proposed to generalize the analysis of a broad set of
security attacks, including observability and data injection attacks,
that target the state estimator of a smart grid. First, the notion of
observability attacks – denial–of–service attacks on measurement
units which render the system unobservable – is defined based on
a proposed graph-theoretic construct. In this respect, an algorithm
is proposed to characterize the critical set of measurements which
must be removed along with a certain measurement to make the
system unobservable. It is then shown that, for the system to
be observable, these critical sets must be part of a maximum
matching over a proposed bipartite graph. In addition, it is shown
that stealthy data injection attacks are a special case of these
observability attacks. Then, various attack strategies and defense
policies, for observability and data injection attacks, are shown
to be amenable to analysis using variations of the formulated
maximum-matching problem over a bipartite graph. The proposed
framework is then shown to provide a unified basis for exact
analysis of four key security problems (among others), pertaining
to the characterization of: 1) The sparsest stealthy attack, 2) The
sparsest stealthy attack including a certain specific measurement,
3) A set of measurements which must be defended to thwart all
potential stealthy attacks, and 4) The set of measurements, which
when protected, can thwart any attack whose cardinality is below
a certain threshold. A case study using the IEEE 14-bus system
containing a set of 17 distributed measurement units is used to
corroborate the theoretical findings. In this case analysis, stealthy
attacks of lowest cardinality are characterized and shown to have
a cardinality equal to 2. In addition, it is shown, for example, that
defending only 3 out of the 17 measurements is enough to thwart
any stealthy attack with cardinality lower than 3, while defending
a minimum of 13 measurements is needed to thwart all possible
stealthy attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the integration of information and communication tech-
nologies in power systems, new security concerns have emerged
due to the potential exploitation of this cyber layer to infiltrate
and compromise the underlying physical system [1], [2]. Indeed,
in recent years, various studies have focused on analyzing the
security of emerging cyber-physical power systems [1]–[14] and
the effect of potential cyber attacks on the various operational
components of the grid, ranging from power system state es-
timation [4], [5], to electricity markets [6]–[8], power system
protection [9], [10], and power system dynamics and control [9],
[11]–[14].
This research was supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation under
Grants ECCS-1549894 and CNS-1446621.
Such attacks can become more pronounced when they target
critical power system functions such as state estimation. In this
regard, the power system state estimation is an integral smart grid
process in which system-wide measurements are collected and
processed to estimate the global state of operation of a power sys-
tem [15]. State estimation is the basis for various grid operational
decisions such as congestion management, economic dispatch,
contingency analysis, and electricity pricing [16]. As a result,
the critical importance of state estimation to the sustainable
operation of the grid makes it a primary target of possible cyber-
physical attacks [1], [2]. Such attacks may target the availability
of the collected measurements as well as their integrity.
In this respect, intercepting a subset of the collected measure-
ment data using availability attacks (such as denial-of-service
attacks) can render the power system unobservable (i.e. not fully
observable), a state in which the collected measurements do not
provide enough independent equations to estimate the states.
Such cyber-physical attacks, to which we refer as observability
attacks hereinafter, will make the operator partially oblivious
to the real state of operation of the system, leading to unin-
formed operational decisions. Beyond observability attacks, data
injection attacks (DIAs) have emerged as a malicious type of
integrity attacks which aim at manipulating the collected state
estimation data, leading to inaccurate state estimation outcomes
that result in misinformed operational decisions with potentially
detrimental consequences [1], [4], [6]. As shown in [4], such
DIAs can stealthily target the power system state estimation
process – manipulating the collected measurements and altering
the state estimation outcome – while being undetectable by the
system operator using traditional bad data detection mechanisms.
Hence, due to their potential danger to system operation, such
stealthy data injection attacks (SDIAs) and observability attacks
have been the focus of various recent research efforts [17]–[23].
A. Related Works
In this regard, the works in [17] and [18] focused on com-
puting a security set which comprises the minimum set of
measurements which must be attacked in addition to a certain
specific measurement in order to make the system unobservable.
Moreover, the work in [19] focused on computing the cardinality
of the smallest set of meters which when attacked render the
system unobservable. The authors in [20]–[22] extended such
observability problems to studying SDIAs. In this regard, these
works focused on characterizing the sparsest stealthy attack
containing a certain specific measurement. In addition, the work
in [23] focused on characterizing a set of measurements to
defend so that no attack which concurrently manipulates a set
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of meters whose cardinality is below a certain threshold can be
stealthy. Hence, this latter analysis focuses on the defense against
resource-limited attackers. As such, these works have focused on
formulating and studying mathematical problems whose solu-
tions enable anticipating potential sophisticated attacks – which
constitutes a first step towards deriving corresponding defense
mechanisms – and designing optimal defense strategies to thwart
such attacks and mitigate their potential effect.
The computational complexity of these problems [17]–[23]
has led to limiting the analysis of their solutions to special,
often approximated, cases or required the use of heuristics and
relaxation techniques which led to suboptimal solutions. For
example, for characterizing the sparsest observability attacks
containing a specific measurement, the work in [17] focused
on the special case of measurement sets of low cardinality
while the work in [18] derived an approximate solution that
is based on the solution of a min-cut problem. In addition,
with regard to the analysis of the sparsest SDIAs containing
a certain measurement [20]–[22], the work in [20] focused on
deriving an upper-bound on this stealthy attack set while the
work in [21] used min-cut relaxation techniques to approximate
the sought solution. Moreover, the work in [22] proposed a
heuristic algorithm which can approximate the solution of the
studied problem while an exact solution was found for the special
case in which power flows over all the transmission lines and
power injections into and out of every bus are assumed to be
measured. To defend against a resource-limited data injection
attacker, the authors in [23] used an l1 relaxation method for
characterizing the set of meters to defend to thwart SDIAs
launched by attackers whose attack space is limited by a certain
cardinality threshold. Other related security works are also found
in [24]–[29].
Therefore, this rich body of literature [17]–[29] employs
heuristics and approximation techniques to numerically approx-
imate the solutions to these fundamental observability attacks
and SDIA problems rather than analytically characterizing their
solutions. As such, there is a need for an analytical framework
which allows modeling and studying such data availability and
integrity attacks and enables an analytical characterization of
mathematical solutions to such widely-studied security problems.
In addition, the fact that these works [17]–[23] studied correlated
problems but from different perspectives highlights the need for
a unified framework using which solutions to such correlated
observability attacks and SDIA problems can be studied and
derived.
B. Contributions
The main contribution of this paper is a novel unified graph-
theoretic framework that enables a global detailed modeling
and understanding of observability attacks and SDIAs. As a
result, this framework provides a unified tool for analyzing
various widely-studied observability attacks and SDIA problems
such as those studied in [17]–[23], among others. In addition,
the proposed framework enables the characterization of exact
analytical solutions to such security problems, instead of relying
on numerical approximations or heuristics. This will enable a
fundamental analysis and modeling of potential attack strategies
and the derivation of defense strategies which can thwart and
mitigate the effect of such observability attacks and SDIAs.
In this regard, our proposed framework is based on a shift
in the modeling of observability attacks and SDIAs from a
linear algebra frame of reference to a graph-theoretic perspective.
As a result, based on this proposed framework, such attacks
can be modeled and analyzed by requiring only power system
topological data, namely, the power system 1-line diagram and
the location of deployed measurement units without the need for
neither line parameters data nor the exact knowledge of power
flow levels throughout the system.
To build the proposed framework, we first begin by introduc-
ing a graph-theoretic basis of observability attacks and, then, we
prove that SDIAs are a special case of such observability attacks.
In this respect, we introduce an algorithm providing a step-by-
step approach for building critical sets, a set of measurements
– containing a certain specific measurement – which, when
removed, render the system unobservable. We then prove that for
a DIA to be stealthy, the attacked measurements should strictly
result in leaving critical sets unmatched as part of a maximum
matching over an introduced bipartite graph. As such, a graph-
theoretic model of SDIAs is then introduced based on which
the solutions to various well-studied SDIA problems are analyt-
ically characterized. In particular, we show that our developed
framework can be readily applied to derive analytical solutions
to various SDIA problems such as, but not limited to: 1) Finding
the stealthy attack of lowest cardinality, 2) Finding the stealthy
attack of lowest cardinality, including a specific measurement,
3) Finding a set of measurements which when defended can
thwart all possible stealthy attacks, and 4) Finding a set of
measurements to defend against a resource-limited attacker,
among others. A case study using the IEEE 14-bus system, with
17 distributed measurement units, is considered throughout the
paper to showcase the developed analytical concepts. In this case
study, we characterize the sparsest SDIAs which can successfully
target the system and show that the cardinality of such attacks
is equal to 2. In addition, the performed case analysis on the
IEEE 14-bus system shows that defending a characterized set
of 13 (out of 17) measurements is necessary to prevent any
successful SDIAs, while defending only 3 measurements is
enough to thwart any stealthy attack of cardinality lower than
3. This, hence, enables the defender to build on some acquired
knowledge regarding the resources of the adversaries to derive
a corresponding defense strategy.
In this respect, the derived analytical results and presented
case study showcase the importance of the proposed framework
for studying various correlated observability attacks and SDIA
problems and pave the way for further analyzing additional
emerging problems in that field.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces state estimation and power system observability. Sec-
tion III introduces our proposed graph-theoretic foundation of
observability attacks and shows its impact on modeling and
analyzing such data availability attacks. Section IV introduces
the proposed graph-theoretic framework for modeling SDIAs, as
well as studies and solves various well-studied SDIA problems.
Section V concludes the paper and provides an outlook detail-
ing the impact of the proposed framework on studying future
observability and data injection attacks.
II. STATE ESTIMATION AND OBSERVABILITY
We next provide an overview of state estimation and of the
algebraic and topological concepts of observability in power
systems. This overview provides background material which is
useful for the analysis that follows.
A. State Estimation Process
Consider a power system state estimation process which
uses various measurements collected from across the system to
estimate the voltage magnitudes and phase angles at every bus
in the system, known as the system states [15]. Let z ∈ Rm (m
being the number of measurements) be the vector of collected
measurements, which includes power flow levels (real and reac-
tive) over transmission lines, power (real and reactive) injected
in or withdrawn from certain buses, as well as bus voltage
magnitudes. In addition, let x ∈ Rn be the vector of system
states. The relationship between the measurements and the states
directly follows from the linearized power flow equations [15]:
z =Hx+ e, (1)
where H ∈ Rm×n is the measurement Jacobian matrix and
e ∈ Rm is the vector of random errors that typically follows
a Gaussian distribution, N(0,R), where R is positive definite.
Here m ≥ n, that is the dimension of x cannot be larger than the
dimension of the measurement vector, z. Further, we assume that
H is a full-rank matrix. Using a maximum-likelihood estimator
– a weighted least squares estimator (WLS) for a Gaussian error
vector e – an estimate of the states, xˆ, will be:
xˆ = (HTR−1H)−1HTR−1z. (2)
This estimate of all the states provides visibility of the steady-
state operating conditions of the system, based on which various
operational decisions are performed [15].
B. Power System Observability
The observability of the power system consists of the ability
to uniquely determine its states based on the collected set of
measurements [15]. Observability, hence, requires the collected
measurements to provide enough independent equations to allow
the estimation of the state vector, x. In this respect, the power
system is observable1 if and only if the measurement matrixH is
of full column rank [15], which was our initial assumption. This
is known as algebraic observability. Due to the P − θ, Q − V
decoupling2 in power systems [16], the observability analysis
can be decoupled by separately studying the observability of
voltage phase angles, using real power measurements, and the
observability of voltage magnitudes, based on reactive power
measurements. Since the two analyses are identical, we focus
here on phase angle observability. To this end, we consider z ∈
Rm to be a vector of real power measurements (bus injections
and line flows), and the state vector x ∈ [−pi, pi]n to be the
vector of voltage phase angles (in radians). Here, n = N − 1
1Otherwise, when this observability condition is not met, the power system is
dubbed unobservable.
2P denotes real power, θ denotes voltage phase angles, Q denotes reactive
power, and V denotes voltage magnitudes.
for a power system with N buses given that the phase angle of
the reference bus is fixed and is taken to be the reference with
respect to which all other phase angles are calculated [15].
An alternative measure of observability, which is equivalent
to algebraic observability, is proposed in [30] and uses graph-
theoretic techniques to introduce the concept of topological
observability. In this regard, let the power system 1-line diagram
be represented as a graph G(N ,L) in which the set of verticesN ,
|N | = N , represents the set of buses of the power system while
the set of branches L, |L| = L, represents the set of lines. One
key result that was shown in [30] and that will be of relevance
to our work is the following:
Remark 1: A power system is observable if and only if the
set of measurements can be assigned to the edges of the power
system graph, following a set of assignment rules, in a way to
form a spanning tree over this graph.
In this respect, let M be the set of measurements and let
f(.):M→ L be an assignment function defined as follows.
Definition 1: f(.): M → L is a measurement assignment
function which assigns measurements in M to lines in L
following a set of assignment rules defined as [30]:
1) If l1, l2 ∈ L and l1 6= l2, then f−1(l1) 6= f−1(l2). In other
words, a measurement cannot be simultaneously assigned
to two different lines.
2) If m is a measurement over a transmission line l, then m
can only be assigned to l.
3) If m is an injection measurement over bus η ∈ N , then
m can only be assigned to an unmeasured line l that is
incident to η.
If such a measurement assignment that yields a spanning tree
over the power network G can be found, the power system will
be observable (and vice versa). Fig. 1 shows an example of mea-
surement assignments over the IEEE 14-bus system. This figure
shows the tree branches (marked in solid red lines) to which
measurement where assigned as part of the measurement assign-
ment function. The measurements that were assigned to each
one of these branches are identified using dashed arrow lines
originating from the assigned measurement and pointing to the
line to which this measurement is assigned. This tree is formed
of branches {1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19} and
spans the whole vertex set N of the power system graph G, and
hence, is a spanning tree. As a result, since this measurement
assignment yields a spanning tree, then the available set of
measurements renders the system observable.
Various algorithms of low complexity have been proposed to
find and build such a spanning tree [30]–[32]. In this regard, the
work in [30] proposes an algorithm to find a spanning tree over
G, which will be used in some of the derivations in the following
sections. This algorithm starts by processing flow measurements
by assigning each flow measurement to its corresponding branch
to form disjoint tree components. Then, injection measurements
are assigned to lines in a way to connect these tree components to
form one spanning tree. Here, we highlight one type of injection
measurements, namely, boundary injections, which will play a
crucial role in our derivations.
Definition 2: A boundary injection is an injection measure-
ment over a bus incident to lines whose flow is measured and
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Fig. 1. IEEE 14-bus system with measurement assignment.
lines whose flow is not measured [30].
Boundary injections play a major role in connecting these
tree components. Indeed, for a bus which is not incident to
a measured line to be connected to the spanning tree, it has
to be reachable from a boundary injection through a series of
measurement assignments [30]. As such, boundary injections are
considered to be sources and unmeasured buses are considered
to be sinks which must be connected to these sources following
the set of measurement assignment rules.
We next build on the foundation of topological observability to
present a graph-theoretic framework for modeling and studying
the security of the smart grid facing observability attacks and
SDIAs. This framework is based on our proposed concepts of
critical sets and observability sets, which we define and derive
in the next section.
III. OBSERVABILITY ATTACKS
The sustainable and efficient operation of the power system
requires an accurate observability of all its states [15]. Security
attacks that target this observability can cause a limited (or
partial) monitoring ability for the operator over the power system
which can lead to incorrect operational decisions. Hence, study-
ing and modeling attacks which can target the full observability
of the system is indispensable for the sustainable operation
of the grid. In this respect, we define a cyber-physical attack,
dubbed observability attack, that consists of launching a denial-
of-service (DoS) attack against a set of measurements to make
the system unobservable. We next study this type of attacks by
introducing and characterizing what we define as critical sets and
observability sets and prove that the well-studied stealthy data
injection attack is a subset of our defined observability attacks.
This latter finding will provide us with a unified set of tools to
solve various widely-studied SDIA problems.
A. Critical Sets
Understanding and modeling observability attacks requires an
in-depth understanding of the effect of the loss of any bundle of
measurements on the observability of the system. In this regard,
we next introduce a structured method for identifying, for each
measurement m, the set of additional measurements including m
(denoted as the critical set of m), which when removed renders
the system unobservable. To this end, we first characterize
the set of potential measurements to be investigated, for each
measurement m, and then provide the necessary discussion and
introduce the underlying method for characterizing the critical
set of m. In this process, we prove that characterizing such a
critical set is at most as complex as solving a maximum matching
problem over a bipartite graph. Then, a detailed algorithm is
introduced to provide a step-by-step method for characterizing
such critical sets.
Let MC ⊆ M be the set of measurements which are part
of the assignment function, i.e., the measurements assigned to
form a spanning tree over the power network. We refer to
measurements not part of MC as unassigned measurements.
Such unassigned measurements are, hence, by definition redun-
dant measurements. We consider that the system is originally
observable. Hence, such a spanning tree and its corresponding
set of assigned measurements exist. We also let T (N ,B) be
the spanning tree whose set of branches are captured by the
set B ⊆ L. B, in essence, represents the set of lines to which
measurements were assigned as part of the assignment function
f(.). For example, as previously mentioned, in Fig. 1, the
branches of the spanning tree are represented in solid red lines.
Consider an assigned measurement m ∈ MC . Since m is
assigned, its removal will split the tree T into two spanning
trees T m1 (Nm1 ,Bm1 ) and T m2 (Nm2 ,Bm2 ) spanning subgraphs Gm1
and Gm2 , respectively, such that N = Nm1 ∪ Nm2 and B =
Bm1 ∪ Bm2 ∪ {f(m)}. Fig. 2 provides an illustrative example
of the two spanning trees created by the deletion of the flow
measurement over line 2 (we denote this flow measurement by
F2). Fig. 2 represents the same system shown in Fig. 1 and will
be used throughout this work to provide a practical example of
the defined concepts and analytical derivations.
To investigate observability, we define a set of measurements
for each measurement m ∈ MC , which we refer as the
critical set of m and we denote by Cm, as follows:
Definition 3: For a measurement m ∈ MC , the critical set
of m, denoted as Cm ⊆M, is a set of measurements which can
be used to reconnect T m1 and T m2 when m is deleted.
Consequently, when m is removed, any m′ ∈ Cm can be
used to reconnect T m1 and T m2 . For convenience, we consider
m to be part of its own critical set Cm. Let Lm be the set of
lines connecting a bus in T m1 to a bus in T m2 . In addition, let
Nm1,2 ⊆ Nm1 and Nm2,1 ⊆ Nm2 be the set of nodes in, respectively,
Nm1 andNm2 which are connected to a node in, respectively,Nm2
and Nm1 . An example of these notations is provided in Fig. 2.
Lm is, hence, formally defined as:
Lm = {l ∈ L | l = (η1, η2), η1 ∈ Nm1,2, η2 ∈ Nm2,1}. (3)
We next introduce the set of rules that should be followed to
build the critical set of a certain measurement, following which,
we provide a structured algorithm for building such critical sets.
Based on the measurement assignment rules described in
Section II-B, a necessary condition for a measurement m′
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to be in Cm is for it to be either a line flow measurement
over a line l ∈ Lm or an injection measurement over a bus
η ∈ {Nm1,2 ∪ Nm2,1}. We denote this set of measurements, for a
measurement m, by Mm. Here, for convenience3, we consider
Mm not to include measurement m. The measurements inMm
are the only measurements which can be assigned to a line in
Lm, and hence, are the only measurements with the potential
of reconnecting T m1 and T m2 . An example of the set Mm for
m := F2 is shown in Fig. 2.
The measurements in Mm can be split into three different
categories: 1) flow measurements over lines in Lm, which we
denote as MmF ,4 2) unassigned injection measurements over
buses in Nm1,2 ∪ Nm2,1, and 3) assigned injection measurements
over buses in Nm1,2 ∪Nm2,1, i.e., measurements in Mm ∩MC . A
representation of this partition is shown in Fig. 3
In this regard, not all measurements in Mm are necessarily
in Cm. In fact, for m′ ∈Mm to be in Cm, it must be redundant.
Namely, m′ must be assignable to a line in Lm to reconnect
T m1 and T m2 , without causing any disconnections within either
T m1 or T m2 . In this respect, if m′ ∈ Mm is unassigned, i.e
m′ /∈MC , m′ would be part of Cm. For example, consider the
injection measurement over bus 4 in Fig. 2, which we denote by
I4. Measurement I4 is in MF2 and is a redundant measurement
since it was not assigned to any line as part of the original tree
T . Hence, when F2 is removed, I4 can be assigned to line 7 to
reconnect T F21 and T F22 without causing any disconnection in
T F22 , in which it is located. Hence, I4 ∈ CF2 .
3Given that m is always considered to be part of its critical set Cm, m is
always added to Cm after investigating the measurements in Mm.
4Such measurements are unassigned measurements. In fact, if m is a line
measurement, lines in Lm would form a loop with f(m) and hence cannot be
part of the original spanning tree. Moreover, if m is an injection measurement,
MmF would be an empty set since, otherwise, based on the spanning tree building
method described in Section II-B and originally presented in [30], one of the
measurements inMmF would have been assigned to a line in Lm, and m would
not have been part of MC . As a result, measurements in MmF are redundant.
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As a result, since the measurements in MmF and the unas-
signed injection measurements over buses in Nm1,2 ∪ Nm2,1 (which
are the first two categories of measurements inMm, as shown in
Fig. 3) are redundant, they are part of Cm. Now, when m′ ∈Mm
is assigned as part of the original assignment function, i.e.,
m′ ∈ Mm ∩ MC (which corresponds to the third category
of measurements in Mm, indicated in Fig. 3), then additional
investigation is needed to determine whether m′ is redundant,
and hence, whether it can be considered in Cm.
In this regard, consider that m′ ∈ Mm is assigned to a
line l′, that is f(m′) = l′ ∈ B. If m′ is to be reassigned to
a line l ∈ Lm, T m1 and T m2 will be reconnected, but since
m′ was originally assigned as part of the original tree, another
portion of the tree gets disconnected by this reassignment of
m′ to l instead of l′. Hence, m′ can be part of Cm if another
measurement can be used to reconnect the subgraph which
was disconnected by the reassignment of m′ from l′ to l. For
example, consider the injection measurement over bus 13 in
Fig. 2, which we denote by I13. I13 has been assigned to line 12
as part of the original spanning tree. Hence, if I13 is assigned
to line 20 to reconnect T F21 and T F22 after measurement F2 is
removed, it cannot be assigned to line 12 anymore which will
split T F21 into two subtrees, one formed by buses {12, 13} and
line 19 and the other subtree composed of buses {6, 10, 1, 5}
and lines {13, 10, 1}. We denote these two subtrees as T F21,1
and T F21,2 , respectively. In this respect, if another measurement
can replace I13 in reconnecting T F21,1 and T F21,2 , then I13 can
be assigned to line 20 and, hence, should be part of CF2 .
To this end, consider the injection measurement over bus 12,
denoted by I12, which was not part of the original spanning
tree assignment. I12 can be assigned to line 11 to reconnect
T F21,1 and T F21,2 in case I13 is reassigned to line 20 instead of
line 12. Hence, I13 is indeed redundant, resulting in I13 ∈ CF2 .
To generalize the analysis in this example, we next provide a
general discussion of measurements inMm∩MC (i.e., the third
category of measurements inMm, shown in Fig. 3) which allows
determining whether a measurement in this set is part of Cm.
More generally, consider m′ ∈ Mm ∩MC to be a measure-
ment assigned to a branch l′ = f(m′) in T m1 , and letMm1 be the
set of measurements in Gm1 . Reassigning m′ to l ∈ Lm instead
of l′, to reconnect T m1 and T m2 , will split T m1 into two subtrees
T m1,1 and T m1,2. These trees, respectively, span subgraphs Gm1,1 and
Gm1,2. Let Mm1,1 and Mm1,2 be the sets of measurements in Gm1,1
and Gm1,2. m′ can be reassigned to l only if some measurement
in Mm1 can reconnect T m1,1 and T m1,2. Hence, this corresponds to
finding a measurement assignment that connects the two subtrees
T m1,1 and T m1,2. As discussed in Section II-B, two subtrees can
be interconnected by using a measurement assignment if the
processing of an unassigned boundary injection in one of them
reaches a node in the other. We denote such unassigned boundary
injections as backup boundary injections, which we formally
define as follows:
Definition 4: A measurement m′′ ∈Mm1 \{Mm1 ∩Mm} is a
backup boundary injection for a measurement m′, if m′′ can be
used to reconnect T m1,1 and T m1,2 generated by the reassignment
of m′ ∈Mm ∩MC to a line l ∈ Lm instead of its original line
assignment f(m′) = l′. The set of all such backup boundary
injections for this measurement m′ ∈Mm ∩MC is referred to
as the backup boundary injection set of m′ and is denoted by
Imb−m′ .
Since the algorithm in [30] is based on connecting subtrees –
to build a full spanning tree – by starting from an unassigned
boundary injection in a certain subtree (as a source) to reach
a node in another subtree (as a sink), this algorithm can be
employed to locate a backup boundary injection for a measure-
ment m′ ∈Mm ∩MC . To this end, to find a backup boundary
injection of m′, we run the algorithm in [30] by starting from
an unassigned boundary injection in either T m1,1 or T m1,2 and
checking whether the algorithm reaches a bus in T m1,2 or T m1,1,
respectively. As such, using the spanning tree building algorithm
provided in [30, Fig. 1], one can identify the backup boundary
injections for each injection measurement in m′ ∈Mm ∩MC .
Here, we note that a backup boundary injection cannot be an
injection measurement in Mm, since if m′′ ∈ Mm and m′′ is
unassigned, m′′ will itself be part of Cm, as previously discussed.
For example, consider the injection measurements on buses 2 and
4 of Fig. 2, denoted by I2 and I4, respectively. I2 is an assigned
injection measurement in MF2 . I2 can be assigned to line 3
instead of line 4 to reconnect T F21 and T F22 . However, this will
split bus 2 from the rest of T F22 . I4 is an unassigned boundary
injection in GF22 and can reconnect bus 2 to T F22 by assigning
I4 to line 4. However, I4 is itself an injection at a bus in NF22,1.
Hence, I4 is an unassigned injection in MF2 , and is as a result
part of CF2 . Thus, it cannot be considered a backup boundary
injection for I2.
Therefore, an assigned injection measurement m′ ∈ Mm ∩
MC is a redundant measurement and is, as a result, part
of Cm if it has a nonempty boundary injection set Imb−m′ .
However, a boundary injection may be part of multiple backup
boundary injection sets. In this regard, based on the measurement
assignment rules, an injection measurement can be assigned to
only one line at a time. In relation to backup boundary injections,
an unassigned boundary injection can act as a backup boundary
injection for only one measurement in Mm ∩MC , at a time.
Hence, if two measurements m1 and m2 in Mm ∩MC have
only one and the same backup boundary injection, only one
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Fig. 4. Maximum matching over the injection measurements - backup boundary
injections bipartite graph.
of them can be in Cm, concurrently. As a result, due to this
one-to-one assignment requirement between backup boundary
injections and injection measurements inMm∩MC , finding this
assignment can be performed by solving a maximum matching
problem over a bipartite graph5, as the one shown in Fig. 4.
We refer to this graph as the injection measurements - backup
boundary injections bipartite graph.
In this bipartite graph, the left-side nodes denote the injection
measurements in Mm ∩ MC and right-side nodes denote the
union of their backup boundary injections,
⋃
m′∈Mm∩MC
Imb−m′ ,
in which each node represents one backup boundary injection.
In this bipartite graph, an edge exists between a node m′ ∈
Mm ∩ MC , on the left-side of the graph, and a boundary
injection m′′, on the right-side of the graph, if m′′ ∈ Imb−m′ .
Here, we note that a boundary injection can be simultaneously
part of different backup boundary injection sets. Hence, finding
the injection measurements in Mm ∩ MC which are part of
the critical set of m, Cm, is equivalent to solving a maximum
matching problem over this bipartite graph, which is a problem
whose exact solution can be obtained efficiently in polynomial
time6. As a result, the matched left-side nodes in this maximum
matching over the injection measurements - backup boundary
injections bipartite graph are the injection measurements in
Mm ∩MC which will be part of the critical set of m, Cm.
Based on these introduced rules for building critical sets, Al-
gorithm 1 provides a structured step-by-step method for building
the critical set, Cm, for each measurement m ∈MC .
B. Example and Case Analysis
As an example of characterizing the critical sets of the various
measurements in a power system, we consider the IEEE 14-
bus system in Fig. 1. In this example, we refer to an injection
measurement over bus k as Ik and a flow measurement over line
k as Fk. We first consider the measurement over line 2, F2, for
which we find the critical set CF2 using Algorithm 1.
From Fig. 2, we can see that removing F2 will result in split-
ting the original spanning tree into two trees, T F21 (NF21 ,BF21 )
5A matching over a graph is a subset of edges sharing no vertices. A maximum
matching is a matching having the maximum possible number of edges [33].
6The solution of a maximum matching problem over a bipartite graph can be
efficiently obtained in polynomial time by transforming the matching problem
into a max-flow problem, which can be solved in polynomial time using various
known algorithms such as Ford-Fulkerson [33].
Algorithm 1 Critical sets step-by-step procedure
Input: Power system 1-line diagram G(N ,L), measurement set
M, spanning tree T (N ,B), set of assigned measurements
MC , assignment function f(.):M→ L
Output: Critical set Cm for all measurements m ∈MC
1: for m ∈MC do
2: Characterize T m1 , T m2 , Nm1,2, Nm2,1, Lm, Mm
3: Initialize Cm
4: Initialize Mmtest
5: Add m to Cm
6: for m′ ∈Mm do
7: if m′ is a flow measurement then
8: Add m′ to Cm
9: end if
10: if m′ is an injection measurement then
11: if m′ /∈MC then
12: Add m′ to Cm
13: end if
14: if m′ ∈MC then
15: Characterize its backup boundary injection set
Imb−m′
16: Add m′ to Mmtest
17: end if
18: end if
19: end for
20: Solve maximum matching over the injection measure-
ments - backup boundary injections bipartite graph
21: for m′ ∈Mmtest do
22: if m′ is a matched node as part of the maximum
matching then
23: Add m′ to Cm
24: end if
25: end for
26: end for
27: return Critical set Cm for all measurements m ∈MC
and T F22 (NF22 ,BF22 ), such that NF21 = {1, 5, 6, 10, 12, 13}
and NF22 = {2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14} are the sets of nodes of
the two trees and BF21 = {1, 10, 13, 12, 19} and BF22 =
{4, 6, 8, 15, 9, 16, 17} are their sets of branches. In addi-
tion, NF21,2 = {1, 5, 10, 13}, NF22,1 = {2, 4, 11, 14}, LF2 =
{2, 3, 7, 18, 20}, and MF2 = {F2, I4, I11, I2, I1, I5, I13}.
Now, for characterizing the critical set of F2, we explore the
set MF2 .
The first measurement in MF2 is F2. F2 is a flow measure-
ment7. Hence, F2 ∈ CF2 .
The second and third measurements inMF2 are I4 and I11. I4
and I11 are unassigned injection measurements, i.e. I4 /∈ MC
and I11 /∈ MC . Hence, {I4, I11} ⊆ CF2 . Indeed, I4 can be
assigned to line 7 to reconnect T F21 and T F22 , while I11 can be
assigned to line 18 for that purpose.
I2 is the fourth measurement in MF2 and the last remaining
injection measurement on Nm2,1 to be explored. I2 is an assigned
measurement, originally assigned to line 4 as part of the spanning
tree T . Since I2 ∈MC , assigning I2 to lines 2 or 3 to reconnect
7F2 is the only flow measurement in MF2 .
TABLE I
CRITICAL SETS OF THE MEASUREMENTS INMC .
Measurement (m ∈MC) Critical Set (Cm)
F2 {F2, I4, I11, I13}
F8 {F8, I4, I7, I9}
F9 {F9, I4, I7, I11, I13}
F15 {F15, I7}
I1 {I1, I4, I11, I13}
I2 {I2, I4, I11, I13}
I3 {I3, I2, I4}
I5 {I5, I11, I13}
I6 {I6, I11}
I9 {I9, I11}
I13 {I6, I12, I13}
F17 {F17, I9, I13}
F19 {F19, I6, I12}
T F21 and T F22 will disconnect bus 2 from the rest of T F22 . Hence,
we next characterize the backup boundary injection set of I2,
i.e. IF2b−I2 . The only unassigned boundary injection in GF22 that
is not part of MF2 is I7. However, using the algorithm in [30,
Fig. 1], we can observe that starting from I7, the algorithm does
not reach bus 2. Hence, bus 2 cannot be reconnected to the rest
of T F22 using any unassigned boundary injections over buses in
GF22 . Hence, IF2b−I2 = ∅, and as a result F2 /∈ CF2 .
Similarly, exploring I1 and I5 – the fifth and sixth mea-
surements in MF2 – which are both assigned measurements,
i.e. {I1, I5} ⊆ MC , shows that they both have empty backup
boundary injection sets8, i.e. IF2b−I1 = ∅ and IF2b−I5 = ∅. Hence,
neither I1 nor I5 are part of CF2 .
The only remaining measurement in MF2 is I13. I13 is an
assigned measurement, I13 ∈ MC . As previously discussed in
Section III-A, when I13 is reassigned to line 20 to reconnect T F21
and T F22 , the subtree containing buses 12 and 13 and line 19 gets
disconnected from the rest of T F21 . Hence, we next characterize
the backup boundary injection set of I13, i.e. IF2b−I13 . To this
end, I12, the only unassigned boundary injection measurement
in GF21 , can be assigned to line 11 to reconnect the two subtrees,
and is the only boundary injection which can do so. Hence,
IF2b−I13 = {I12}.
As a result, the injection measurements - backup boundary
injections bipartite graph is composed of only I13 on the left-
side connected to IF2b−I13 = {I12} on the right-side. Hence, I13
is matched to the backup boundary injection I12. As a result,
I13 ∈ CF2 .
The processing of MF2 is thus complete, resulting in CF2 =
{F2, I4, I11, I13}.
Similarly, Algorithm 1 can be carried out to characterize the
critical sets of all of the measurements in MC in the IEEE 14-
bus system in Fig.1. The results are listed in Table I.
We next discuss the value of critical sets with regard to under-
standing and analyzing observability attacks. We also introduce
the concept of observability sets, a generalization of critical sets,
which provides a holistic modeling of observability attacks.
Notation: We use the following notation in the derivations
that ensue. For the Jacobian matrix H , we let H(−K)+(K
′)
8If I1 or I5 are to be reassigned to lines 2 or 3, respectively, to reconnect
T F21 and T F22 , each of these reassignments will split T F21 into two subtrees
which cannot be reconnected using the unassigned boundary injection I12, as
can be shown by a run of the algorithm in [30, Fig. 1]. Here, we note that I12
is the only unassigned boundary injection in GF21 .
correspond to H but with the removal of the rows corresponding
to measurements in K and the addition of rows corresponding
to measurements in K′.
C. Observability Sets
Next, in Theorem 1, we show that the derived critical sets are
indispensable for modeling observability attacks.
Theorem 1: For m ∈ MC , removing its critical set, Cm,
renders the system unobservable.
Proof: By topological observability, we know that a system
is observable if and only if a spanning tree could be formed
using an assignment function. When m is removed, the original
spanning tree T is split into two disjoint trees T m1 and T m2 ,
spanning subgraphs Gm1 and Gm2 , respectively. By definition
of Cm, the only way to reconnect T m1 and T m2 is to use
measurements in Cm. Hence, if all measurements in Cm are
removed, then T m1 and T m2 cannot be connected using an
assignment function, which implies that a spanning tree cannot
be formed, implying that the system is not observable. As such,
removing a critical set renders the power system unobservable.
Based on Theorem 1, the critical measurements9 of a power
system can be characterized using critical measurement sets, as
shown in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: m is a critical measurement if and only if its
critical set is Cm = {m}.
Proof: By definition, if m is a critical measurement, remov-
ing it will render the system unobservable. Hence, if the critical
set of m is such that Cm ⊃ m, then removing m would not affect
the observabilty of the system since any other measurement
m′ ∈ Cm \ {m} can be used to replace m and reconnect the
tree. As such, Cm ⊃ {m} ⇒ m is not a critical measurement,
which proves the contrapositive: m is critical ⇒ m is the only
element in its critical set, i.e. {m} = Cm. Conversely, if m
is the only element in its critical set, its removal constitutes
removing a complete critical set, which by Theorem 1 renders the
system unobservable. As a result, Cm = {m} ⇒ m is a critical
measurement. Thus, m is critical if and only if Cm = {m}.
In addition, removing a full critical set decreases the rank of
the Jacobian matrix by 1. This is shown in Theorem 2, which
will be proven next. However, we first present the following pre-
liminary lemma, which is essential for the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 1: Let m ∈ M be an injection measurement over a
bus η that is assigned to a line l, f(m) = l. Then, replacing
m by a hypothetical line flow measurement m′ over line l
will not affect the rank of matrix H . In other words, let
H(−m)+(m
′) be the the Jacobian matrix with the removal of
the row corresponding to measurement m and the addition of
the row corresponding to the hypothetical measurement m′, then
rank(H) = rank(H(−m)+(m
′)).
Proof: Since m is assigned, i.e. is part of the original
spanning tree measurement assignment, removing it will split
the original spanning tree into two subtrees T m1 and T m2 . By
the definition of the critical set Cm, any measurement in Cm
could replace m to reconnect T m1 and T m2 . If m′ existed, it
9In power systems, a critical measurement is a single measurement which
when removed renders the system unobservable [15].
would have been part of Cm because m′ can reconnect T m1 and
T m2 . Hence, replacing m by m′ will not affect the connectivity
of the spanning tree and, hence, rank(H) = rank(H(−m)+(m
′)).
Theorem 2: For m ∈ MC , removing its critical set, Cm,
results in rank(H(−C
m)) = rank(H)− 1.
Proof: Since the system is originally fully observable,
rank(H) = N − 1. Now, let Mm1 and Mm2 be the mea-
surement sets in subgraphs Gm1 and Gm2 , respectively, and let
H
(−Cm)
1 and H
(−Cm)
2 be the Jacobian matrices of Gm1 and Gm2 ,
respectively, composed of measurements in Mm1 \ {Mm1 ∩Cm}
and Mm2 \ {Mm2 ∩ Cm}. Since T m1 and T m2 respectively span
Gm1 and Gm2 , this implies that rank(H(−C
m)
1 ) = N1 − 1 and
rank(H(−C
m)
2 ) = N2 − 1. In addition, let m′ ∈ Mm1 \ {Mm1 ∩
Cm} be an injection measurement over a bus in Nm1,2. Since
m′ ∈ Mm1 \ {Mm1 ∩ Cm}, then m′ is assigned to a certain
branch b′ = f(m′) ∈ T m1 ; otherwise, m′ would have also been
in Cm. By Lemma 1, m′ can be replaced by a hypothetical line
flow measurement over b′ without affecting the rank of H(−C
m)
1 .
As such, let H(−C
m)′
1 be the same as H
(−Cm)
1 but replacing
any row corresponding to an injection measurement in Nm1,2 by
its corresponding hypothetical line flow measurement. The same
can be done to form Jacobian matrix H(−C
m)′
2 from H
(−Cm)
2 .
By Lemma 1, rank(H(−C
m)′
1 )=rank(H
(−Cm)
1 ) = N1 − 1 and
rank(H(−C
m)′
2 )=rank(H
(−Cm)
2 ) = N2 − 1.
Now, let us return to H(−C
m). By rearranging its elements
to include first the measurements in Mm1 \ {Mm1 ∩ Cm} then
the elements of Mm2 \ {Mm2 ∩ Cm}, H(−C
m) can be written as
H(−C
m) =
[
H
(−Cm)
1
H
(−Cm)
2
]
. In this respect,
rank(H(−C
m)) = rank
([ H(−Cm)1
H
(−Cm)
2
])
= rank
([ H(−Cm)′1 0
0 H
(−Cm)′
2
])
= (N1 − 1) + (N2 − 1)
= N − 2 = rank(H)− 1.
Therefore, Theorem 2 shows the effect of the removal of a
single critical set on the rank of the Jacobian matrix. Theorem 1
and Theorem 2 provide a necessary condition for observability
of the power system under observability attacks. In fact, the
contrapositive of Theorem 1 states that if a power system is
fully observable, then the investigated observability attack (i.e.
the removal of measurements) did not result in removing a full
critical set. Next, we extend this concept to account for the
interconnection between multiple critical sets.
In fact, for a measurement m′ to be in the critical set of a
measurement m, i.e. m′ ∈ Cm, the critical set of m′, Cm′ ,
must contain measurements other than m′, i.e. Cm′ ⊃ {m′}.
Otherwise, m′ would not be redundant. For example, consider
injection measurements I6 and I9. Removing I6 and I9 will
render the system unobservable – even though I6 and I9 do not
form a critical set – since CI6 = {I6, I11} and CI9 = {I9, I11}.
As such, if I6 is removed, I11 can be used to replace I6
since I11 ∈ CI6 . However, if I9 is also removed, even though
I11 ∈ CI9 , I11 cannot be used to replace I9 since I11 has
already been used as a replacement to I6. Therefore, remov-
ing I9 and I6 does render the system unobservable. Indeed,
rank(H−(I6)−(I9)) = 12 < N − 1 = 13.
This concept can be extended to the interconnection between
multiple critical sets. For example, consider F2, I1, I2, and I5
and their critical sets shown in Table I. We can see that F2,
I1, and I2 have critical sets sharing measurements I4, I11, and
I13. Hence, if F2, I1, and I2 are removed, I4, I11, and I13 are
assigned, one to each of these measurements, to preserve system
observability and, hence, cannot be used as part of further critical
sets in case further measurements are removed. Hence, since
CI5 = {I5, I11, I13}, removing F2, I1, I2 and I5 will render
the system unobservable, even though {F2, I1, I2, I5} is not a
critical set.
In this respect, the concept of critical sets must be further
developed to yield a general graph-theoretic concept of observ-
ability attacks. This development is provided as follows. We
build a bipartite graph in which each left-side node represents
one of the critical sets of the power system, and each right-side
node represents one measurement of the system. An example
of this bipartite graph is shown in Fig. 5. In this respect, an
edge is drawn between a critical set Ci and a measurement j
if j ∈ Ci. We refer to this bipartite graph as the critical sets -
system measurements bipartite graph. Based on this formulation,
a general concept of observability is established in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3: If the system is observable, then the maximum
matching over the critical sets - system measurements bipartite
graph includes all critical sets.
Proof: We prove this theorem by proving its contrapositive
which is the following: if the maximum matching does not
include all critical sets, then the system is not observable.
The contrapositive can be proven as follows. If one critical set
is not matched to any measurements, then this critical set cannot
be used to connect two subgraphs of the system. Since these
two subgraphs can only be connected by this critical set, then
there is no measurement assignment which will connect these
two subgraphs. As a result, a spanning tree cannot be formed,
implying that the system is not observable.
This proves the contrapositive of this theorem and, hence,
proves the theorem.
Theorem 3 can be used to fully characterize observability
attacks as follows. An observability attack is one in which
measurements are removed (i.e. nodes from the right-side of
the critical sets - system measurements bipartite graph) such
that the maximum matching over the bipartite graph does not
include all critical sets (i.e. nodes on the left-side of the critical
sets - system measurements bipartite graph), which renders
the system unobservable. This, as a result, provides a general
analytical characterization of observability attacks and enables
an analytical prediction of the effect of the removal of a subset
of measurements on the observability of the system. For example,
such characterization allows analytical derivation of various
security indices related to observability attacks such as finding
the observability attack of lowest cardinality, or finding the
minimal set of measurements to remove in addition to a certain
measurement to make the system unobservable. This, as a result,
provides analytical tools which are necessary to further assess
the vulnerability of a system against observability attacks as
well as derive defense strategies to thwart such attacks. Indeed,
in what follows, we focus on stealthy data injection attacks –
proving that they are a subset of observability attacks – and show
how our provided analytical characterization of observability
attacks enables solutions of various widely-studied stealthy data
injection attack problems. To this end, we introduce sets of
measurements, dubbed observability sets, as follows, which are
valuable for the analysis of data injection attacks which ensues.
Definition 5: An observability set S ∈ M, is a set of
measurements such that strictly removing S leads the maximum
matching over the critical sets - system measurements bipartite
graph not to include a certain critical set.
The term “strictly” in this definition reflects that adding any
measurement s ∈ S, which was removed, back to the right-side
of the bipartite graph will result in reincluding the previously
unmatched critical set in the maximum matching. A union of
observability sets is, then, defined to be a set of measurements
composed of a number of observability sets such that, when each
of these sets is successively removed, each such removal leads
to excluding one additional critical set from being part of the
maximum matching over the critical sets - system measurements
bipartite graph. Adding back any of the removed measurements
to the right-side of the bipartite graph will result in reincluding
one of the unmatched critical sets in the maximum matching.
These observability sets play a crucial role in characterizing
stealthy data injection attacks, as will be shown next.
We next introduce stealthy data injection attacks and prove that
they are a variant of our introduced observability attacks. This
enables further studying and solving various problems related to
SDIAs using our developed analytical tools.
IV. STEALTHY DATA INJECTION ATTACKS
A. Stealthy Data Injection Attacks
Recalling the measurement-state equation in (1), data injec-
tion attacks aim at replacing the measurement vector, z by a
manipulated measurement vector za = z+a, where a ∈ Rm is
the attack vector, resulting in a new state estimate xˆa. However,
typically, the state estimation process is run in conjunction with
what is known as a bad data detector and identifier (BDD).
The BDD aims at detecting and identifying the presence of
outliers in the collected data set, so that such outliers can be
removed preventing them from affecting the estimation outcome.
Such BDDs rely on the statistical analysis of what is known as
measurement residuals, r, defined as [15]:
zˆ =Hxˆ = Sz, r = z − zˆ = (In − S)z =Wz, (4)
where S =H(HTR−1H)−1HTR−1 and W = In − S.
A statistical analysis on the residuals enables analysis of the
magnitudes of the errors associated with each measurement, and
hence, allows the identification of outliers [15]. Regarding data
injection attacks, when data is added to certain measurements,
the adversary aims at keeping the residuals unchanged, so that the
attack cannot be detected by the BDD. Indeed, as shown in [5],
an attack vector that falls in the column-space of the Jacobian
matrix H , i.e. a =Hc, cannot be detected by residual statistical
analysis. Indeed, for a =Hc,
ra =W (z + a) = r +Wa
= r + [In −H(HTR−1H)−1HTR−1]Hc
= r +Hc−Hc = r. (5)
As such, given the weighted least squares state estimation
equation in (2), the attack vector a =Hc generates an arbitrary
new state estimate xˆa = xˆ+ c by choosing the constant vector
c without inducing any changes to the residual vector, as shown
in (5). Such DIAs are, hence, stealthy and are referred to as
stealthy DIAs. The ability of SDIAs to stealthily manipulate
the state estimates poses various challenges to the operation
of the grid. Hence, understanding and modeling such attacks is
indispensable to the secure and sustainable operation of power
systems.
To this end, we next introduce a holistic graph-theoretic
modeling of SDIAs that is based on the graph-theoretic modeling
of observability attacks introduced in Section III.
B. Graph-Theoretic Modeling of SDIAs
The observability attacks and observability sets introduced in
Section III provide the basis for a graph-theoretic interpretation
of SDIAs as will be shown in Theorem 4. However, before
introducing and proving Theorem 4, we introduce a preliminary
lemma which will be used in the proof of Theorem 4.
Lemma 2: If a DIA is stealthy (i.e. a =Hc), then removing
the attacked measurements renders the system unobservable.
Proof: Since the attack vector a is stealthy, then a =Hc.
Since H is of full rank, then the only solution to Hc = 0 is
c = 0. Hence, a = Hc has zero and nonzero elements for
c 6= 0. Now, if all of the rows of H corresponding to nonzero
elements of a are removed to form matrixHnew, then, this results
in anew =Hnewc = 0 for c 6= 0. Hence, Hnew is not of full rank
and the power system whose Jacobian matrix is given by Hnew
is unobservable. Therefore, when the attack is stealthy, removing
the attacked measurements renders the system unobservable.
Here we note, that the result of Lemma 2, provides a one
directional relation stating that if a = Hc, i.e. the attack is
stealthy, then the removal of the nonzero elements of a, i.e. the
attacked measurements, causes the system to be unobservable.
However, the reverse direction does not always hold true. Indeed,
the reverse statement of Lemma 2 states that, if removing a
set of measurements renders the system unobservable, then this
guarantees that a stealthy DIA can be constructed which targets
all of these measurements, and only these measurements. We
next provide a counter example which proves that this reverse
statement does not hold true. In this regard, we consider the
Jacobian matrix H to be represented as follows: H =
[
H0
H1
]
.
We let M0 and M1 represent the subset of measurements
corresponding to the rows of H0 and H1, respectively. Consider
M0 to contain one critical measurement, i.e., one row of H0 is
independent of all of the other rows of H . As such, removing the
subset of measurementsM0 renders the system unobservable. In
addition, consider two measurements m0 ∈ M0 and m1 ∈ M1
such as m0 measures the power flow from bus i to bus j and m1
measures the power flow from bus j to bus i (i.e., m0 and m1 are
installed on the same transmission line but measure the flow in
two opposite directions). In this regard, let h0 and h1 correspond
to the rows of m0 and m1 in, respectively, H0 and H1. Then, we
have10 h0 = −h1. As a result, one cannot find a stealthy attack
vector a =
[
a0
a1
]
=
[
H0
H1
]
c, in which all the elements of
a0 are nonzero and all the elements of a1 are zero, since if
h0c 6= 0, then h1c 6= 0, due to the fact that h0 = −h1. This
implies that for the attack to target all the measurements in M0
and be stealthy, this attack must also target measurements inM1.
Otherwise, this attack must be limited to a strict subset of M0
and may not target all the measurements inM0. As a result, even
though removing the measurements in M0 renders the system
unobservable, one cannot necessarily construct a stealthy attack
vector that only targets all the measurements inM0. Hence, this
provides a counter example of the reverse statement of Lemma 2
proving that this reverse statement does not always hold true.
Theorem 4: A DIA is stealthy if and only if the attacked
measurements constitute a union of observability sets.
Proof: We begin by proving that when the attacked measure-
ments (i.e. nonzero elements of the attack vector a) constitute
a union of observability sets, then a is stealthy (i.e. a can be
represented as a = Hc). As shown in Theorem 3, when an
observability set (equivalently, a union of observability sets)
is removed, the system is unobservable. Hence, consider an
observability set S which has been removed. Let H(−S) be the
system’s Jacobian matrix without the measurements in S and let
C be the critical set which cannot be part of a maximum matching
over the critical sets - system measurements bipartite graph
when S is removed. Since the system is unobservable when
removing S, H(−S)y = 0 for a y 6= 0. However, the addition
of any measurement s ∈ S will reinclude C in the maximum
matching over the critical sets - system measurements bipartite
graph, and hence, reconnect the tree. As such, let H(−S)+(k)
correspond to H(−S) with the addition of a row corresponding to
a measurement k ∈ S. In this regard, since the system is rendered
observable, H(−S)+(k) is of full rank and H(−S)+(k)y will have
one nonzero element corresponding to the row of H(−S)+(k)
pertaining to the added measurement k. This procedure can be
repeated for all k ∈ S. As such, adding the rows corresponding
to S back to the Jacobian matrix results in b = Hy in which
only the elements of b corresponding to measurements in S are
nonzero. As a result, a = b is an attack vector in which only
the observability set S is attacked and is proven to be stealthy.
Now, we prove that, when an attack is stealthy, i.e. a =Hc,
then the nonzero elements of a correspond to a union of
observability sets. In this regard, from Lemma 2, we know that
removing the nonzero elements of a = Hc will render the
system unobservable, which implies that the nonzero elements
of a contain at least one observability set. Let S denote this
observability set, and let H(−S) be the system’s Jacobian matrix
without the measurements in S. Removing S will lead to two
subsystems each of which is fully observable (i.e. it will split the
10Since Pij = −Pji, where Pij and Pji are the real power flow from bus i
to bus j and from bus j to bus i, respectively, over the same transmission line.
spanning tree, T , into two subtrees each of which spans its own
subgraph). Let H1 and H2 be the Jacobian matrices of each of
these two subsystems (we denote these subsystems as subsystem
1 and subsystem 2) and let a1 and a2 correspond to the portions
of a (excluding the measurements of the previously removed
observability set) corresponding to the measurements in H1 and
H2, respectively. In addition, let c1 and c2 correspond to the
portions of c pertaining to nodes in subsystem 1 and subsystem
2, respectively. Now, if ai for i ∈ {1, 2} has nonzero elements,
this implies that removing these elements will make subsystem
i unobservable, which implies that the nonzero elements of ai
contain an observability set. Following this same logic, removing
this observability set will subsequently split subsystem i into two
subsystems, each of which is observable. This process can be
continued recursively until no measurement m corresponding to
a nonzero element of a remains. Hence, this shows that when
a =Hc, then the nonzero elements of a correspond to a union
of observability sets.
This proves both directions of the theorem, and hence, con-
cludes the proof.
Theorem 4 provides an analytical graph-theoretic modeling
of SDIAs using the fundamentals of observability attacks intro-
duced in Section III. This enables a fundamental understanding
of SDIAs since it allows the characterization of the subset of
measurements which would be compromised as part of an SDIA
and hence enables defense against such attacks. In addition, this
analytical characterization of SDIAs enables a more in-depth
analysis of such integrity attacks and allows a unified derivation
of analytical solutions to a wide-range of well-studied problems
in this field, as will be explored in Section IV-C.
Example 1: As an illustrative example of the result11 in
Theorem 4, we consider the IEEE 14-bus system, shown in
Fig. 1, whose line transmission data can be found in [34]. We
consider the stealthy attack a = Hc with c = [1, 0, ..., 0]T ,
which corresponds to having the attack vector equal to the
first column of the Jacobian matrix H given by H(:, 1) =
[−16.9, 0, 0, 0,−16.9, 33.37,−5.05,−5.67,−5.75, zeros(1, 8)]T .
This attack consists of attacking measurement indices
{1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} which correspond to {F2, I1, I2, I3, I4, I5}.
In this respect, we next verify whether this attack is stealthy,
following Theorem 4. To this end, Fig. 5 shows a portion of
the critical sets - system measurements bipartite graph that is
relevant to the attacked measurements. The post-attack portion
of Fig. 5 marks the nodes corresponding to measurements
{F2, I1, I2, I3, I4, I5}, on the right-side of the bipartite graph,
as attacked (following the attack vector a). As a result, all
the edges connecting these nodes to the critical sets on the
left-side of the bipartite graph are removed. Then, building a
maximum matching over the post-attack bipartite graph shows
that, indeed, not all the critical sets are matched. Hence, the
removed measurements lead to a maximum matching that
does not include all critical sets. Furthermore, the addition of
a node corresponding to any of the attacked measurements,
i.e. {F2, I1, I2, I3, I4, I5}, would lead to reincluding one of
11In this example, we index the measurements in Fig. 1 from
1 to 17 in an incremental manner based on the following order
(F2, F8, F9, F15, I1, I2, I3, I4, I5, I6, I7, I9, I11, I12, I13, F17, F19).
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Fig. 5. Critical sets – system measurements maximum matching and SDIAs.
the unmatched critical sets {CF2 , CI3 , CI5} in the maximum
matching. This implies that the attack consists of a union of
observability sets which implies that the attack is, indeed,
stealthy.
C. Unified Solution to Diverse SDIA Problems
Theorem 4 provides a basis for studying various SDIA prob-
lems from a graph-theoretic perspective. Indeed, this represen-
tation provides a unified approach for characterizing analytical
solutions to various widely-studied SDIA problems. In this re-
gard, we next present a set of such SDIA problems and show that
the derivations leading to Theorem 4 enable the understanding
and characterization of analytical solutions to these problems.
SDIA analyses can be categorized based on whether the focus
is on modeling the attack or the defense strategies. As such, we
first present two problems focusing on modeling attack strategies
followed by two problems focusing on the derivation of defense
strategies to thwart SDIAs.
1) Modeling SDIA Attack Strategies: Modeling SDIA attack
strategies enables a vulnerability assessment of the system and
allows anticipating sophisticated attack strategies which can
target the system. This, in turn, allows the derivation of adequate
defense strategies to thwart such attacks. As such, solving SDIA
problems focusing on modeling the attack strategies is indispens-
able to understanding such attacks and, as a result, defending the
system against them. We next focus on two problems which aim
at modeling potential attack strategies.
Problem 1: If measurement k ∈ M is attacked, what is the
minimal set of measurements which must be attacked along with
k for the attack to be stealthy? In other words, Problem 1 seeks
the solution to the following optimization problem:
min
c
||Hc||0,
subject to: H(k, :)c = 1. (6)
Problem 1 has been proposed in [20] and studied in [21]
and [22]. However, the derived solution in [21] is based on an
approximate relaxation method while the solution in [22] focuses
on the special case assuming that the measurement set consists
of all injection measurements at all buses and all line flow mea-
surements at all transmission lines, which limits its generality.
Instead, here, we provide a general analytical characterization of
the solution to this problem using our developped graph-theoretic
framework.
The solution to this problem enables a vulnerability assess-
ment of each measurement against SDIAs since it shows, for
each measurement, what is the minimum number of measure-
ments which must be additionally compromised to potentially
launch an SDIA against the system. This can represent a security
index of that measurement following which, a measurement with
a lower (higher) security index is more (less) vulnerable to
SDIAs. In other words, a measurement which has a low security
index is more easily targeted by SDIAs since the adversary would
not need to comprise a large number of additional measurements
to lunch the stealthy attack. Such knowledge can be used to
improve the security of the system – by adding redundancy or
adding security defense mechanisms (such a encryption tech-
niques or advanced meetering uints) – at the meters which are
deemed the most vulnerable to SDIAs.
The analytical graph-theoretic solution to Problem 1 is char-
acterized in Theorem 5.
Theorem 5: The stealthy attack of smallest cardinality con-
taining measurement k corresponds to attacking the measure-
ments of the critical set of lowest cardinality which contains k.
Proof: First, we show that the attack containing the critical
set of lowest cardinality containing k is, indeed, stealthy. Then,
we prove that this attack corresponds to the stealthy attack
containing k that has a minimum cardinality.
By Theorem 4, for the attack to be stealthy, the removal of
the attacked measurements must lead the maximum matching
over the critical sets - system measurements bipartite graph not
to include all the critical sets (i.e. all the left-side nodes of the
bipartite graph). In other words, the attack must be composed
of a union of obseravbility sets. In this respect, removing the
critical set containing k that is of smallest cardinality is, indeed,
stealthy since removing a whole critical set will disconnect the
node corresponding to this critical set (on the left-hand side of
the critical sets - system measurements bipartite graph) from
the right-side of the bipartite graph which prevents this critical
measurement from being part of a maximum matching.
Next, we prove that there are no stealthy attacks containing
k that have a smaller cardinality. In this regard, for an attack
containing k to be stealthy, it must prevent a critical set, in
which k exists, from being part of the maximum matching
over the critical sets - system measurements bipartite graph. To
this end, a critical set would be excluded from the maximum
matching in two cases: 1) if all the measurements corresponding
to this critical set are attacked, or 2) if all the measurements
corresponding to this critical set are part of a different matching,
which assigns these measurements to other critical sets.
In the first case, considering attacking all the measurements
in a critical set, then attacking the critical set that has the
fewest number of measurements – as stated in this theorem –
corresponds to the minimum cardinality attack.
As for the second case, if a measurement k′ in a critical set
containing k is matched – as part of a maximum matching – to
another critical set (we denote this set by Cp), then measurement
p must be attacked since, otherwise, Cp would have been matched
to p sparing k to be matched to another critical set to maximize
the cardinality of the matching. In other words, matching a
critical set Cp with a measurement k′ 6= p while p is not
attacked is contradictory to the assumption that this matching
is maximum. As a result, for a critical set C, such that k ∈ C, to
be discarded from the maximum matching, every measurement
in C must be matched to another critical set. This implies that at
least one measurement of each of these critical sets is attacked.
Thus, the number of attacked measurements will be at least
equal to the number of measurements within C for the attack
to be stealthy. Consequently, the stealthy attack containing k
that has the lowest cardinality corresponds to attacking only the
measurements within the critical set containing k that has the
lowest cardinality.
Solving Problem 1 will also facilitate solving another key
SDIA problem, referred to as Problem 2, and stated as follows.
Problem 2: What is the SDIA with the lowest cardinality? In
other words, which SDIA is a solution to:
min
a
||a||0,
subject to: a =Hc. (7)
Similarly to Problem 1, the solution to Problem 2 also provides
a vulnerability assessment of the system against SDIAs. In
fact, Problem 1 focuses on finding the security index associated
with each measurement. On the other hand, Problem 2 focuses
on the system as a whole by focusing on finding, in general,
the sparsest data injection attack which can target the system
and be stealthy. This corresponds to a security index for the
whole system. Indeed, this security index reflects the amount of
effort that an attacker must put to potentially launch an SDIAs
against the system. A low security index shows that, even when
manipulating a small set of measurements, the attack can be
stealthy. In contrast, a high security index reflects the robustness
of the system against SDIAs since the attacker would need to
concurrently manipulate a large number of measurements to
potentially launch a successful SDIA.
The solution to Problem 2 is provided in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: The stealthy attack with the lowest cardinality
corresponds to attacking the smallest critical set.
Proof: This proof follows directly from the proof of Theo-
rem 5. Indeed, since the stealthy attack containing measurement
k that is of smallest cardinality corresponds to the critical set
of lowest cardinality containing k, then searching for the global
stealthy attack of lowest cardinality should be limited to only
critical sets. Based on this fact, the stealthy attack of lowest
cardinality is the one in which the measurements in the critical
set of lowest cardinality are the only measurements that are
attacked (the only measurements having nonzero corresponding
elements in the attack vector a).
Example 2: For example, by inspecting the critical sets in
Table I, we can solve Problem 1 and Problem 2 for the IEEE
14-bus system shown in Fig. 1. With regard to Problem 1,
the results of Theorem 5 can be readily applied to find the
minimum stealthy attack containing a certain measurement k. For
example, the minimum stealthy attack containing measurement
I4 corresponds to attacking CI3 = {I3, I2, I4}, since that is the
critical set of smallest cardinality containing I4. As for Problem
2, the stealthy attack of lowest cardinality is one in which either
CF15 = {F15, I7}, CI6 = {I6, I11}, or CI9 = {I9, I11} are
attacked. As such, the minimum possible cardinality of a stealthy
attack for this IEEE 14-bus system is 2. To find such a stealthy
attack, the basis of the null space can be found for matrices
H−(C
F15 ), H−(C
I6 ), or H−(C
I9 ). We refer to these vectors as
nF15 , nI6 , and nI9 , respectively. As a result, these stealthy attack
vectors of minimum cardinality can be obtained as αHnF15 ,
αHnI6 , or αHnI9 , where α is a scalar multiplier.
2) Modeling SDIA Defense Strategies: The knowledge ac-
quired from our introduced graph-theoretic framework enables
the derivation of adequate defense policies which can thwart
potential SDIAs. In this regard, next, two fundamental widely-
studied problems for defending the system against SDIAs are
presented and investigated in Problem 3 and Problem 4.
Problem 3: What is the minimum set of measurements that
need to be protected (i.e. made immune to SDIAs) to guarantee
no SDIAs can be successful?
The solution to this problem enables finding a minimum-cost
defense strategy to thwart all potential SDIAs. Hence, this makes
the system robust against all possible SDIAs. However, even
though the solution to this problem provides the minimum-cost
defense strategy (assuming that protecting each measurement is
equally costly), for a practically large power system with several
thousand buses, such a defense strategy is likely to exceed any
practical security budget.
The solution to Problem 3 is presented in Theorem 6.
Theorem 6: The minimum set of measurements that must
be protected to guarantee that no SDIAs can be successful
corresponds to protecting all measurements in MC , i.e. all
measurements that are part of the original assignment function
forming the spanning tree over the power system.
Proof: By Theorem 4, for an attack to be stealthy, it
must lead to a critical set not to be matched as part of a
maximum matching over the critical sets - system measurements
bipartite graph. Hence, to guarantee that no attack can be stealthy,
all critical sets must be guaranteed to be matched. Thus, the
minimum number of measurements to be protected must be at
least equal to the number of critical sets, which is equal to
the number of measurements in MC . In this regard, protecting
every measurement m ∈MC results in protecting the minimum
possible number of measurements which guarantees that Cm can
be matched to m for all m ∈MC , hence, guaranteeing that no
stealthy attack can be successfully carried out.
This proof can also be carried out equivalently using the
techniques of linear algebra. Indeed, protecting all the measure-
ments in MC will guarantee that these measurements will be
part of the Jacobian matrix H . Since these measurements form
a spanning tree over the power system, their rows in H are
linearly independent. As such, let HC be the Jacobian matrix
corresponding only to measurements in MC , then HCc = 0
has no solution other than c = 0. The rows of HC are a subset
of the rows of H . As such, one cannot find an attack vector
a = Hc such that all the elements of a corresponding to the
rows of HC are zero. Hence, one cannot find a stealthy attack
a = Hc which does not attack the measurements in MC . As
a result, protecting these measurements will guarantee that no
stealthy attack can be carried out.
Here, the minimum defense set, solution to Problem 3, might
not be unique. In other words, the setMC might not be the only
minimum set of measurements which, when defended, makes the
system immune to SDIAs. However, characterizing a solution
to this problem provides important information regarding the
size of investments needed to make a power system immune
to SDIAs. In this regard, regardless of how high the number of
measurements in an N -bus system is, the number of measure-
ments that must be protected to render the system immune to
SDIAs is always equal to N−1. As such, by assessing the costs
of reinforcing the security of each measurement unit, the solution
to Problem 3 enables the calculation of the cost needed to
make the system robust against SDIAs. However, as the solution
implies, for practical power systems, securing this number of
measurements might exceed practical budget constraints.
Example 3: Applying the results in Theorem 6 to our treated
IEEE 14-bus system case analysis, protecting the measurements
in the first column of Table I is the set of measurements of
minimal cardinality which when protected renders the IEEE 14-
bus system in Fig. 1 immune to SDIAs.
Theorem 4 and the solutions to Problem 1, Problem 2,
and Problem 3 can be used to solve Problem 4 which was
proposed in [23] and which is presented next. The solution to
Problem 4 in [23] was derived based on an l1 relaxation of the
corresponding optimization problem which leads to approximate,
rather than generally accurate solutions.
Problem 4: What is the minimum set of measurements to
protect as to force the attacker to manipulate at least τa mea-
surements to stay stealthy?
As discussed in Problem 3, making the system completely
robust against SDIAs may be very costly and exceed any practi-
cal budgetary constraints. As a result, rather than considering all
theoretically possible SDIAs, the solution to Problem 4 focuses
on defending the system against a large subset of practical
SDIAs in which the attacker’s limited resources prevents its
attack vector’s cardinality from exceeding τa. In other words, an
attacker might not be able to concurrently comprise more than
τa measurement units. This, hence, enables defending the system
against a practically large subset of potential SDIAs. In addition,
the solution to this problem allows using the knowledge about
the resources of potential attackers – which can be potentially
acquired from historical data – to compute adequate defense
policies against such attacks.
The solution to Problem 4 is presented in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: A minimum set of measurements to protect
so that no attack with cardinality ||a||0 < τa can be stealthy,
corresponds to protecting one distinct measurement from each
critical set whose cardinality is less than τa.
Proof: Solving Problem 4 entails ensuring that all critical
sets of cardinality smaller than τa are part of the maximum
matching. Hence, when one distinct measurement in each of
these sets is secured, it is ensured that these critical sets will
be part of the maximum matching over the critical sets -
system measurements bipartite graph. As a result, additional
measurements would need to be attacked to target critical sets
of higher cardinality, if a stealthy attack were to be found,
which would require the attacker to manipulate more than τa
measurements. Hence, the solution to Problem 4 is a direct
result of Theorem 6 but by considering critical sets that have
cardinality smaller than τa rather than all critical sets, as is the
case in Theorem 6. As such, the rest of the proof of Proposition 2
follows directly from the proof of Theorem 6.
This result is very important since it allows the defender to
build on some knowledge that it has about the capacity and
resources of the attacker, to build a corresponding defense policy.
In other words, knowing that the attacker does not have the
capacity to concurrently manipulate more than τa measurements
enables the defender to focus on defending a smaller set of mea-
surements rather than aiming to thwart any theoretically possible
SDIA. This can lead to a significant reduction in the needed
resources for such a defense since, as shown in the solution of
Problem 3, the latter defense policy requires committing a large
volume of resources which can exceed practical constraints.
Example 4: For our studied IEEE 14-bus system, consider that
τa = 3. This indicates that a set of measurements to protect must
be found to ensure that no attacker can have a successful stealthy
attack by attacking less than 3 measurements. The critical sets
that have cardinality lower than 3 are CF15 , CI6 , and CI9 which all
have a cardinality of 2. Now, we consider a distinct measurement
in each of these three sets, such that I7, I6, and I9. As a result,
{I7, I6, I9} is a minimum set of measurements which, when
defended, no stealthy attack vector of cardinality less than τa = 3
can be successfully launched.
As such, showing that SDIAs are a subset of our intro-
duced observability attacks, enables using our proposed graph-
theoretic framework to model, understand, and thwart such types
of cyber-physical attacks. Indeed, the four problems that we
have discussed show the way our developed framework enables
analytical characterization of the solutions to these various well-
studied SIDA problems. Such analytical characterization allows
assessing the vulnerability of the system against SDIAs as well
as deriving adequate defense strategies.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE OUTLOOK
In this paper, we have introduced a novel graph-theoretic
framework which enables a fundamental modeling of observ-
ability attacks targeting power systems and have proven that
the widely-studied stealthy data injection attacks are a special
case of such observability attacks. Based on this proposed
framework, we have characterized the analytical solutions to
various central observability and data injection attack problems.
These solutions aim at capturing potential attack strategies as
well as suggesting defense policies to thwart such attacks. In
this respect, we have shown that our derived framework enables
characterization of the sparsest stealthy attack as well as the
sparsest stealthy attack including a certain measurement. With
respect to defense policies, we have shown that our graph-
theoretic framework enables the analytical characterization of
the minimum measurement set which when defended guarantees
thwarting any potential stealthy attack as well as the minimum
set of measurements whose defense guarantees that no attack
below a certain cardinality can be stealthy.
The proposed graph-theoretic framework provides a general
analytical tool using which a wide set of key observability
attacks and data injection attacks problems can be modeled and
analyzed, and is not limited to the set of problem examples
which are studied in this paper. For example, the problem of
characterizing the sparsest stealthy attack containing a certain
measurement can be extended to studying the sparsest stealthy
attack containing a certain set of measurements. Using our
proposed framework, a solution approach can be investigated
to potentially derive analytical solutions to this critical problem.
The solution of this problem enables a risk assessment of the
power system by quantifying the risk of having a vulnerable set
of measurements and the way that such a vulnerability can be
leveraged by an intelligent malicious attacker. Along the same
lines, for security assessment, a central problem is quantifying
the sparsest stealthy attack possible when a certain set of
measurements is defended. The solution to this problem enables
assessment of the effectiveness and impact of an implemented
defense strategy. This problem has been formalized in [23].
However, the proposed solution approach in [23] relied on an
l1 relaxation of the original optimization problem formulation
which leads to approximate numerical solutions. However, our
introduced graph-theoretic framework can be used to attempt the
characterization of analytical solutions to this problem.
Beyond these one-sided attack and defense problems, the
ability to analytically characterize attack and defense policies
using the proposed framework allows studying problems that
involve interactions between attackers and defenders from a
game-theoretic perspective. Such analyses can account for the
opponent’s potential attack or defense strategies when designing,
respectively, defense policies or attack vectors. As a result,
such analyses allow the modeling and investigation of practical
competitive attack vs. defense settings. This enables studying the
effects of sophisticated observability attacks and data injection
attacks on the system as well as the impact of proposed defense
strategies within various application domains such as electric-
ity markets, congestion management, and contingency analysis,
among others, thus taking the application of our framework
beyond the domain of power systems which motivated this study.
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